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Abstract: The development and deployment of matching procedures that incentivize 
truthful preference reporting is considered one of the major successes of market design 
research. In this study, we test the degree to which these procedures succeed in 
eliminating preference misrepresentation. We administered an online experiment to 1,714 
medical students immediately after their participation in the medical residency match—a 
leading field application of strategy-proof market design. When placed in an analogous, 
incentivized matching task, we find that 23% of participants misrepresent their 
preferences. We explore the factors that predict preference misrepresentation, including 
cognitive ability, strategic positioning, overconfidence, expectations, advice, and trust. 
We discuss the implications of this behavior for the design of allocation mechanisms and 
the social welfare in markets that use them.  
 
 
 
People often have strong incentives to lie about their preferences. These 
incentives are unfortunate, since market organizers must commonly make decisions 
based on the preferences that individuals report. Auction prices are often determined 
based on bids, but potential buyers may not bid their true valuation. Employees are often 
hired based on interviews, but job seekers may feign interest for the positions available. 
Students are often assigned to schools based on reported school preferences, but 
applicants may be incentivized to list an attainable school as their favorite. In 
environments like these, economists have devoted substantial effort to mitigating this 
problem by designing strategy-proof mechanisms that render truthful preference 
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reporting incentive compatible. With such a mechanism in place, market participants who 
understand how outcomes are determined will see that there is no benefit to lying.   
A growing body of evidence suggests that individuals misrepresent their 
preferences in incentive-compatible environments despite the futility of such efforts. 
Imperfect truth-telling has been documented in laboratory experiments studying sealed-
bid and clock auctions (1), in willingness-to-pay elicitations (2), and in applications of 
school-choice matching mechanisms (3–7). This work has informed recent theoretical 
advances aimed at characterizing mechanisms that are “obviously strategy-proof” to 
relatively unsophisticated decision-makers (8). In many contexts, attendance to this 
criteria yields comparatively easy-to-understand mechanisms; however, in the context of 
stable two-sided matching mechanisms, no obviously strategy-proof options exist (9). An 
immediate implication is that, in matching environments where stability is required, we 
must rely on a degree of sophistication in market participants for optimal behavior to 
emerge. 
Particularly in the context of student matching markets, these findings can be 
viewed as troubling. A key argument motivating the adoption of strategy-proof school-
choice mechanisms is that they “level the playing field” (10). In algorithms with a 
nontruthful optimal strategy, strategically savvy—and disproportionately affluent—
students are given an undue advantage at the expense of students who report their 
preferred schools truthfully. If strategy-proof mechanisms result in all participants 
reporting truthfully, this undesirable outcome is averted. However, if the inability to 
understand optimal strategies extends to cases where the optimal strategy requires no 
“gaming” of the system, an unleveled playing field remains. Understanding the 
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prevalence and correlates of such mistakes then becomes crucial for assessing the 
fairness, and indeed the broader welfare consequences, of the allocations that these 
mechanisms generate.  
Unfortunately, directly assessing the prevalence and correlates of preference 
misrepresentation is fundamentally challenging. In the field settings where these 
mechanisms are adopted, preferences are unobservable. Absent observing true 
preferences, the veracity of reported preferences cannot be directly assessed.† 
Experimenters have sidestepped this difficulty in the laboratory by using simplified 
matching scenarios to assign preferences. However, by restricting empirical 
investigations to the lab, such work can only document suboptimal behavior in unfamiliar 
and minimally incentivized tasks completed by populations different from the ones facing 
these mechanisms in the field. On the one hand, these external validity concerns 
potentially mitigate the worry that the observed failure of optimal reporting extends to the 
policy applications of primary concern. On the other hand, if misrepresentation persists in 
populations whose lives are affected by their performance in these mechanisms, the 
design and deployment of these mechanisms may require considerable revision.      
In this study, we aim to achieve the benefits of the lab-experimental approach to 
detecting failures of truth-telling while simultaneously studying the behavior of a highly 
incentivized and highly trained population of direct policy relevance. We deploy a large-
scale online experiment to 1,714 medical students participating in the 2017 National 
Resident Matching Program (NRMP), a system in which graduating medical students 
                                                          
† Despite this difficulty, some attempts to assess rates of truth-telling in field settings have been made. To 
sidestep the difficulty of observing true preferences, researchers have relied on either unincentivized survey 
reports of self-assessed truthful behavior (11) or have examined specific types of reported preferences that 
are so anomalous that they cannot be plausibly explained by preference heterogeneity (12–14).  
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submit their preferences over residency programs to be used to determine their 
placements. The NRMP utilizes a modified version of the deferred acceptance algorithm 
(15, 16), a matching mechanism that is strategy-proof for students and is increasingly 
adopted for school assignment (17). The NRMP constitutes a flagship application of 
matching theory, and remains one of the most carefully designed and extensively studied 
two-sided matching markets in existence.‡ Our online experiment puts NRMP 
participants through a simple incentivized matching task in which truth-telling can be 
easily assessed. By deploying this study immediately after the NRMP match, and by 
transparently applying the same mechanism used by the NRMP, we are able to directly 
study the prevalence and correlates of preference misrepresentation in the precise 
population of interest.  
We document widespread failure to pursue the incentivized strategy of truth-
telling. Over 23% of experimental participants misrepresent preference in our matching 
task, despite using this mechanism to make a career-altering decision mere days before.  
We additionally examine the predictors of misrepresentation, shedding light on 
both the factors that contribute to this behavior and the features of individuals who bear 
the costs. The tendency for suboptimal behavior is associated with both the strength of 
the students’ strategic position (measured by randomly-assigned test scores in the 
matching task) and by the students’ cognitive reasoning abilities (measured by Raven’s 
Matrices deployed after the matching task). Beyond metrics associated with student 
quality, the tendency for suboptimal behavior is associated with students’ 
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overconfidence, with the pursuit and availability of advice in the lead up to the NRMP 
match, and with students’ trust in residency programs to rank students according to 
quality. These results identify the individuals who gain and lose from the complexity of 
the existing system, give guidance on the best practices for training market participants to 
engage with complex mechanisms, and critically inform the study and design of matching 
markets. We further discuss these implications in section IV. 
 
I. Study Population and Sample Recruitment 
We solicited participation in our study by recruiting medical schools to present 
our recruitment materials to their NRMP participants, following recruitment protocol 
derived from previous survey investigations of medical students (19). To do so, we 
contacted representatives of all 147 medical schools accredited by the Association of 
American Medical Colleges (AAMC) located in the United States and Puerto Rico. As a 
result of our initial outreach and subsequent follow-up, we were able to successfully 
recruit 25 medical schools (see SI Appendix table S1 and fig. S1). These 25 schools vary 
widely in class size (min=41, max=328), location, and competitiveness. Compared to the 
full population of accredited medical schools, we find no statistically significant 
differences between participating and non-participating schools on total enrollment, 
average MCAT performance, average undergraduate GPA, acceptance rates, US News 
and World Report Research Rankings, or gender composition (see SI Appendix table S2).   
Shortly after the deadline for submission of residency preferences to the NRMP, 
participating schools forwarded our recruitment email to their graduating student body. 
This email asked students to participate in an anonymous 10-minute survey about 
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decision-making in the NRMP match. Students were further told that they would earn an 
Amazon.com gift card valued between $5 and $50 with an expected value of $21 for 
participating in the survey. All data was collected prior to the NRMP’s announcement of 
the results of the match.  
Approximately 3,300 graduating medical students (17.1% of all graduating 
medical students from AAMC accredited schools) received an email with our survey link. 
Participant demographics are summarized in SI Appendix table S3. Our analysis is based 
on the 1,714 students (approximately 51.9% of the students contacted) who both 
completed the survey and passed all exclusion criteria (see SI Appendix table S4 and fig. 
S2).  
 
II. Experimental Design 
All experimental materials are presented in the SI Appendix; we summarize the 
key measures below. Our materials were reviewed by the University of Pennsylvania 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) and ruled exempt from IRB review (as authorized by 
45 CFR 46.101(b), category 2). Informed consent was elicited on the first page of the 
web survey.  
II.A Incentivized Matching Task 
Participating students were presented with an incentivized matching task. The 
prompt for this task explained: “In this exercise, you will go through a matching process 
much like the NRMP match. You will attempt to match to one of five hypothetical 
residency programs, and the payment you receive for taking this survey will dependent 
on where you match. We will apply the standard algorithm that was used by the NRMP; 
  
7 
 
as a reminder, an example of how this algorithm works is available here.” The underlined 
term hyperlinked to NRMP training materials. Since students receive significant training 
and advice regarding this algorithm in the lead-up to participating in the NRMP match, 
we did not elaborate further on the functioning of this mechanism. 
In each simulation, 50 students applied to 5 residency programs, each with 10 
positions available. The preferences of both the programs and the other students are 
simulated according to guidelines communicated to the participant. We explained that all 
students agree on the same ranking of residency programs. We also explained that 
residency programs based their preferences on several factors, with students’ 
“Hypothetical Standardized Test” (HST) scores being an important one. Based on the 
manner in which programs’ preferences were simulated, every student had some 
possibility of matching to every program. This renders nontruthful preference reporting a 
strictly suboptimal strategy for maximizing expected payoff.    
In order to communicate the desirability of different residency programs, 
participants were presented with a table (fig. 1). For each program, this table reported 
both the average HST score of the admitted students and the value of the Amazon.com 
gift card that participants would receive if they matched. Participants were also told that 
they would earn $5.00 if they did not match to any program. The payment received from 
this matching process was the sole compensation provided for participation.  
After this explanation of the matching task, students submitted their rank-order 
list (ROL) using a series of dropdown menus. Participants were told that they must apply 
to at least one program but could forego latter applications if they wished.  
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We will refer to ROLs that list all five residencies in order of their compensation 
as optimal or truthful, and those that do not as suboptimal or misrepresented. This 
labeling relies on the assumption that participants prefer more money to less. While that 
assumption is both standard and reasonable, under some conditions it could fail. For 
example, failure could arise if subjects prefer to earn less money because they value 
leaving money to the experimenter or to the simulated students that they compete against. 
We consider this possibility unlikely. Failure could also arise if subjects value not only 
the monetary payoffs but also anticipation or disappointment. We further discuss this 
latter possibility in our tests of possible correlates below. While it is necessary to rule out 
non-standard preferences to ensure that misrepresented ROLs identify confusion about 
incentives, misrepresentation stemming from either source would be viewed as 
anomalous from the perspective of standard matching theory.   
 
II.B Correlates of Suboptimal Reporting 
We preregistered our interest in five groups of correlates of suboptimal reporting, 
all proposed and discussed in prior literature (for a summary, see (20)). Not all of the 
variables that we examine are experimentally manipulated, and consequently not all 
analyses can be interpreted as estimating causal relationships. However, some of the 
associations help distinguish between potential factors driving the suboptimal behavior of 
interest. Furthermore, different predictors of misrepresentation suggest different welfare 
costs of this behavior, and the necessary approaches to reduce it. We motivate each factor 
of interest below, and explain its measurement in the context of our study.  
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Student quality: The welfare consequences of misrepresentation can be 
significantly influenced by its correlation with student quality (21). Two distinct 
channels, conflated in the field but separable in our experiment, may generate such a 
correlation. First, students with comparatively low grades or test scores are often placed 
at a strategic disadvantage for obtaining a desirable match. This might result in attempts 
to misrepresent preferences as a means to compensate, or might lead students to fail to 
list desirable programs under the belief that they are unobtainable. Second, students in 
this position might also have comparatively low cognitive ability, which increases the 
probability of incorrectly identifying the optimal strategy in lab experiments utilizing this 
algorithm (22). Our experiment contains measures that allow us to study each channel 
separately.  
To examine the impact of strategic positioning, participants were randomly 
assigned an HST percentile score. This score influenced each participants’ ranking in 
residency program preferences, and thus their strategic position. 
To examine the impact of cognitive ability, we presented participants with a test 
of spatial reasoning. We gave participants five minutes to complete seven Advanced 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices (23), a test widely used to assess logical reasoning ability 
(24). Of course, medical students with low cognitive ability relative to their peers likely 
have substantially higher average cognitive ability than typical populations facing 
matching mechanisms (e.g., school children and their parents). Care is warranted when 
extrapolating our results onto other such populations.  
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Overconfidence: Overconfidence is a prevalent trait among physicians (25), and is 
commonly thought to broadly generate decision errors (26). Furthermore, recent research 
demonstrates that this bias affects suboptimal reporting in the related, but gameable, 
Boston mechanism (27). We generate a measure of overconfidence in the course of 
conducting our test of logical reasoning ability. After completing the Raven’s Matrices, 
participants were asked to think about other medical students participating in this survey 
and to estimate the percentage of participants that they outperformed (slider scale: min: 
0%, max: 100%). We code participants as overconfident if their forecast of their 
performance exceeds their actual percentile rank—in the language of Moore and Healy, 
this is a measure of overplacement (28). A secondary, but similar, measure of 
overconfidence is available from students’ report and assessment of their MCAT 
performance. Participants were asked to report their MCAT score and then estimate the 
percentage of other MCAT takers who received a lower score than they received in the 
year that they took the MCAT (slider scale: min:0%, max:100%).  
 
Desire to rank the expected outcome highly: If students derive utility from the 
anticipation of matching to a program that they rank highly, or if they expect to 
experience disappointment from matching to a program that they did not rank highly, 
then students may be motivated to submit nontruthful preference orderings that manage 
these anticipations. In this case, misrepresentation need not be irrational: in the presence 
of such belief-based utility functions, the deferred acceptance algorithm is not strategy-
proof. 
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We test for the influence of expectations on misrepresentation by randomly 
varying the salience of the participants’ expected match before they submit their ROLs. 
Before proceeding to the submission page, we randomly assigned half of participants to 
indicate the residency where they expected to match. We reminded them of their 
expected match in the list submission prompt.   
 
Pursuit and availability of advice: When mechanisms are sufficiently difficult to 
understand, participants may be significantly influenced by advice (or their tendency to 
seek it) (29, 30). To examine the role of advice, we requested that participants check all 
of the sources that provided them with advice regarding their NRMP submission from the 
following list: 1) Current and/or past medical students who participated in the NRMP, 2) 
Participant’s medical school, 3) The NRMP website, and 4) Other sources. Participants 
then specified the advice they received from each entity in a free-response text box and 
rank ordered them based on the level of influence each had on their NRMP submission.   
 
Mistrust of other market participants: In many mechanisms, a particular action 
(such as truth-telling) may be an optimal strategy if and only if all other market 
participants similarly pursue optimal play. Note that this is not the case in the deferred 
acceptance algorithm that underlies the NRMP matching algorithm: truth-telling is 
optimal regardless of the action of other market participants (31, 32). However, if 
participants misunderstand this distinction, or if they harbor mistrust of other market 
participants that leads them to doubt the credibility of the matching agency, suboptimal 
behavior could arise (33).  
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We asked participants whether they trusted the players in the NRMP matching 
market. Participants indicated 1) whether they trusted that the residencies that they rank 
ordered in their NRMP submission would rank order medical students based on a truthful 
assessment of their quality, 2) whether they trusted other medical students to submit a 
truthful rank ordering of their preferences to the NRMP and 3) whether they trusted the 
NRMP to run the matching algorithm honestly (all questions, 1=Yes, 0=No).   
 
III. Results 
We examine the data in three stages. First, we catalogue the various ways 
participants submitted their ROL of the residency programs in the simulated match and 
document the monetary consequences of suboptimal behavior. Second, we provide 
evidence that behavior in our experiment is associated with known proxies for 
misunderstanding in the NRMP match. Third, we examine the correlates of suboptimal 
behavior. 
III.A Documenting Suboptimal Behavior 
To apply optimally in the incentivized matching exercise, participants must rank 
residencies in order of their monetary value. Applications are suboptimal if participants 
shorten their ROL by not ranking all pertinent programs or permute their ROL by ranking 
their listed programs in an order that does not reflect the monetary payoffs.  
We find that 23.3% (N=399) of participants applied suboptimally. As shown in 
Figure 2, 64.7% of participants who submitted a suboptimal ROL permuted the list of 
residency programs (15.1% of total N) but applied to all five programs, 28.3% (6.6% of 
total N) of participants shortened their ROL, and 7.0% (1.6% of total N) both shortened 
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and permuted their ROL. (See SI Appendix figs. S3 and S4 for analysis of the programs 
removed and misordered in suboptimal ROLs.)  
Failure to submit the optimal ROL was costly. Participants who submitted a 
suboptimal ROL earned $18.20 on average, 21.2% less than the average earnings of 
participants who submitted an optimal ROL, $22.80 (t=-5.43, p<.001).§ However, this 
difference cannot be entirely attributed to the effect of misrepresentation because 
participants’ assigned HST scores affect both their earnings and their propensity to 
misrepresent preferences. As we document in section III.C, misrepresentation becomes 
less common among students assigned comparatively high HST scores. The rate of 
misrepresentation varies from 28.6% in the second lowest decile up to 14.0% in the 
second highest decile. The solid lines in Figure 3 show that the average difference in 
experimental earnings between optimal and suboptimal participants is most dramatic for 
those assigned a comparatively high HST score, but persisted across the distribution of 
assigned strategic positions (for statistical tests, see SI Appendix table S5). While all 
students in the experiment are incentivized to truthfully report preferences, these results 
illustrate that the strength of incentives varies based on the student’s position in the 
market. This variation in incentives is a key feature of this class of matching problems, 
and a possible channel driving the hypothesized association between misrepresentation 
and student ability. A desirable student has a strictly larger set of possible match partners, 
which results in larger differences between the best and the worst outcomes that are 
possible from different reporting strategies.  
 
                                                          
§ SI Appendix fig. S5 assesses the rate of costly misrepresentation at the individual level. 
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III.B Validation of Experimental Behavior 
We conduct three validation exercises to confirm that behavior in our experiment 
proxies for misunderstanding of incentives in the real residency match. 
First, we test for differences in the rate of misrepresentation in our experiment as 
a function of self-reported truth-telling status in the NRMP. We find that students who 
report misrepresenting preferences to the NRMP are 9.4 percentage points more likely to 
misrepresent preferences in our experiment (22.6% vs. 33.0%, 𝜒2=6.19, p=.013).  
Second, we test the correlation between misrepresentation in our experiment and 
the propensity for students to submit comparatively short preference lists to the NRMP. 
Short lists are a known proxy for suboptimal preference reporting and are actively 
discouraged in NRMP training materials (34). We regressed participants’ likelihood to 
shorten their experimental ROL (1=shortened, 0=not) or to permute their experimental 
ROL (1=permuted, 0=not) on the number of programs participants ranked in their NRMP 
submission. We find that participants who submitted either shortened or permuted ROLs 
submitted shorter ROLs to the NRMP (shortened: B= -0.78, SE=0.120, p<.001; 
permuted: B=-0.19, SE=0.089, p=.038) (see SI Appendix fig. S6 for details).  
Third, we examine differences in truth-telling rates across students who do, and 
do not, expect to match to their top-ranked program in the NRMP match. We find that 
participants who expected to match to their top NRMP match choice (N=1,157; 67.5% of 
sample) were significantly less likely to submit an optimal ROL in the incentivized 
exercise (75.1%) compared to participants who did not hold this expectation (80.1 %) 
(𝜒2=5.19, p=.023). This result is consistent with our measure capturing a belief that 
optimal strategies involve strategically ranking attainable schools highly, a key 
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component of optimal strategies in related, but manipulable, mechanisms (e.g., the 
Boston Mechanism).  
In summary, our experimental measure validates well with proxies for suboptimal 
preference reporting in the field.  
 
III.C Examining the Correlates of Suboptimal Behavior 
Figure 4 summarizes the full battery of tests of the correlates of suboptimal 
preference reporting. Plotted are estimated average marginal effects (AMEs) derived 
from a logit model predicting the outcome of submitting a truthful preference ordering. 
Panel B presents the estimate for each univariate model, predicting truth-telling with only 
the single variable represented in that row.¶ These results provide guidance on the 
features of students who do, or do not, face difficulties in pursing the optimal strategy. 
Panel A presents estimates obtained from the complete model, including the entire 
battery of predictors. These provide clearer guidance of the role of each considered 
correlate, holding all else equal. We normalize all continuous variables in this analysis, so 
their coefficients may be interpreted as the association of a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the relevant variable.  
 
Student quality: Prior work examining unincentivized assessments of truth-telling 
status (11) or a subclass of egregious mistakes (12, 13) has provided evidence that 
students with better grades are less likely to misrepresent their preferences. We replicate 
this finding with our incentivized experimental measure. Participants with higher MCAT 
                                                          
¶ SI Appendix fig. S7 reports these analyses using the self-reported measure of truth-telling. In accordance 
with our preregistration plan, we treat these results as secondary.  
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scores were significantly more likely to submit an optimal ROL: a one-standard deviation 
increase in MCAT scores is associated with a five percentage point increase in the rate of 
truth-telling (AME=0.05, SE=0.010, p<.001).   
In field settings, an association with test scores can be jointly influenced by both 
response to a poor strategic position and by differences in logical reasoning ability. These 
channels are separable in our experiment, and we find evidence that both channels are 
active. Participants assigned to higher HST scores were more likely to submit an optimal 
ROL (AME=0.04, SE=0.010, p<.001). Furthermore, participants who performed better 
on the Raven’s Matrices task were more likely to submit an optimal ROL (AME=0.03, 
SE=0.010, p=.002). As indicated in Figure 4A, these estimates maintain comparable 
magnitudes and statistical significance while controlling for the full battery of correlates. 
In summary, the characteristics of high-performing students are useful individual 
predictors of truth-telling behavior, even when holding other factors constant.  
 
Overconfidence: Examined in isolation, participants exhibiting overconfidence on 
the Ravens’ task were two percentage points more likely to submit the optimal preference 
ordering, although we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect (difference of 
proportion z=-0.91, p=.365). This difference becomes greater in both magnitude and 
statistical significance in the complete model, at least partially due to eliminating the 
offsetting effect of our overconfidence measure’s strong negative association with 
Raven’s task performance (r = -0.59, p<.001). All else equal, overconfident participants 
were more likely to submit optimal ROLs compared to non-overconfident participants 
(AME=0.08, SE=0.028, p=.005). Similarly, controlling for MCAT performance, 
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participants who overestimate the percentile of their MCAT score submit an optimal 
ROL at a significantly higher rate (AME=0.09, SE=0.027, p=.001).** 
 
Desire to rank the expected outcome highly: We find no support for an effect of 
our expectations-salience manipulation. No significant difference is found in the 
propensity to report truthfully as a function of the expectations condition (difference of 
proportion z=0.33, p=.743).  
 
Pursuit and availability of advice: Medical students usually seek out and receive 
advice from many sources about how to maximize their chances for admission to a top 
residency program. Consistent with this tendency, 71.6% of participants report receiving 
advice from their medical school, 62.3% reported receiving advice from other students, 
40.6% reported receiving advice from the NRMP website, and 23.6% reported receiving 
advice from other sources. We find that the pursuit and receipt of advice is significantly 
associated with the likelihood to submit an optimal ROL. Participants showed an 
increased likelihood to submit an optimal ROL when they reported receiving advice from 
their medical school (AME=0.08, SE=0.024, p=.001), other students (AME=0.04, 
SE=0.021, p=.043), the NRMP website (AME=0.12, SE=0.020, p<.001), or other sources 
(AME=0.09, SE=0.022, p<.001). As shown in Figure 4A, the estimates associated with 
receiving advice from the NRMP website (AME=0.10, SE=0.021, p<.001) and other 
sources (AME=0.07, SE=0.023, p=.002) remain largely unchanged in the complete 
                                                          
** Since overconfidence is typically associated with decision errors, the positive correlation documented 
here may be viewed as surprising. However, this positive relationship could naturally arise from our results 
on student quality, assuming that overconfidence leads students to overestimate the strength of their 
strategic position. 
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model while those associated with receiving advice from other students (AME=-0.01, 
SE=0.023, p=.565) and from participants’ medical school (AME=0.036, SE=0.025, 
p=.158) attenuate. Similar results are found when regressing truthtelling status on all 
advice sources simultaneously, excluding all other factors (SI Appendix table S6). We 
present extensive exploratory text analysis of the reports of advice received, and show the 
effects of source influence, in the SI Appendix (table S7, figs. S8-S12).   
 
Mistrust of other market participants: While 97.3% of participants trusted the 
NRMP to run the algorithm honestly, 63.4% of participants did not trust other students to 
submit a truthful ROL and 42.0% of participants did not trust their residencies to rank 
order students fairly. We find that participants’ likelihood to submit an optimal ROL 
decreased by five percentage points if they trusted residencies to rank order graduating 
medical students based on an honest assessment of their quality (AME=-0.05, SE=0.020, 
p=.017), but that neither trust in other students (AME=0.00, SE=0.021, p=.982) nor in the 
NRMP significantly affected performance (AME=0.05, SE=0.067, p=.446). These effects 
remain largely unchanged in the complete model, or when regressing truthtelling status 
on all trust measures simultaneously, excluding all other factors (SI Appendix table S8). 
IV Discussion 
A large literature in economics has focused on the design of mechanisms that 
incentivize truth-telling, and a large theoretical literature has assumed that behavior in 
these mechanisms is ultimately truthful. In this paper, we have demonstrated that highly 
trained and incentivized participants in a flagship application of mechanism design 
appear to misunderstand these incentives at a substantial rate. Furthermore, this behavior 
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is critically tied to student quality, to overconfidence, to the pursuit and the sources of 
available advice, and to trust in residency programs.  
An immediate implication of our results is that there is room for training 
programs to help medical students avoid harming themselves through attempts to game 
the system. As we document, students receiving advice from credible advisors are 
significantly more likely to behave optimally. At the same time, students reliant on the 
advice from other students—a potentially non-credible source—are no better, and 
potentially worse, at finding the optimal strategy. These results converge with evidence 
from the lab suggesting that trust in the “folk wisdom” of other market participants may 
be misplaced (35). Indeed, as we document in the SI Appendix (figs. S8 and S9), free-
response descriptions of the advice provided from all sources reveals that a substantial 
fraction of recommended strategies are misguided. Attempts to better direct students to 
credible, high-quality advice are clearly needed. 
Because different groups face different rates of misrepresentation, and because 
misrepresentation harms the outcomes of those who pursue it, the use of this mechanism 
will ultimately favor the groups who best understand it. To the extent that 
misunderstanding is driven by student ability, this can be desirable. Prior research 
highlights the potential for misunderstanding of the deferred acceptance algorithm to 
serve as a screening device and facilitate matching the best students to the best schools 
(21).†† However, our results suggest that factors beyond ability are favored through this 
channel. Overconfident students, students receiving credible advice, and students 
                                                          
†† While screening on ability is the most natural consideration in the NRMP, screening on other dimensions 
can become important in other markets. For example, a recent study of the Hungarian college matching 
system finds that relatively affluent students are more likely to report preferences that suboptimally forego 
chances for scholarships, ultimately resulting in better targeting of financial aid to those in need (13).  
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distrustful of residency programs are the net beneficiaries in our experiment—an 
outcome that is likely undesirable when compared to the outcome that would arise under 
universal truth-telling. Similar results can arise over more basic demographics: for 
example, in our data, women are eight percentage points more likely to misrepresent their 
preferences (𝜒2=16.85, p<.001), implying that men are the net beneficiaries of the 
presence of misrepresentation in this market.  For reasons of both fairness and market 
efficiency, utilization of a mechanism that systematically rewards groups for factors 
independent of ability is typically viewed as undesirable. Further interventions to mitigate 
these effects are likely worthwhile, but to the extent that some residual misunderstanding 
is unavoidable, we encourage further research aimed at formally assessing the 
comparative performance of different matching mechanisms in the presence of persistent 
misunderstanding.  
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Fig. 1. Residency Information for Simulated Residency Match.  
  
Notes: This table was displayed to participants to communicate the desirability of 
different programs. The desirability was communicated in two ways: first, by the average 
scores on the “Hypothetical Standardized Test” (HST) of students admitted to each 
residency; and second, by the value of the gift card that participants would earn by 
matching to that program.   
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Fig. 2. Classification of Truth-telling Behavior.  
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Fig. 3. Monetary Losses Associated with Suboptimal Preference Reporting. 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure summarizes average experimental earnings as a function of both truth-
telling status (optimal versus suboptimal rank ordering) and participants’ randomly 
assigned test scores. The dashed lines represent the overall average earnings for 
participants who submitted suboptimal ($18.20) and optimal ($22.80) rank orderings. The 
solid lines denote average earnings within each decile of assigned test scores. Vertical 
lines at each point show 95% confidence intervals. See SI Appendix table S5 for 
statistical comparisons. 
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Fig. 4. Predictors of Truth-telling. 
Notes: Plotted are estimated average marginal effects derived from a logit model 
predicting whether participants reported truthful preferences. To illustrate the 
interpretation of effect sizes, note that a marginal effect of 0.1 corresponds to a 10 
percentage point increase in the rate of truthful reporting. Panel A presents estimates 
obtained from the complete model, including the entire battery of predictors. Panel B 
presents the estimate for each univariate model, predicting truth-telling with only the 
single variable represented in that row. Participants’ HST score and Raven’s performance 
are normalized. All other measures are binary. Horizontal lines at each data point 
represent 95% confidence intervals. See SI Appendix table S9 for the regression output. 
Sample for all regressions: 1,714. 
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Materials and Methods 
Survey Administration   
 
In 2016, 164 medical schools were fully accredited by the Association of American 
Medical Colleges (AAMC). We contacted the 147 medical schools in the United States 
and Puerto Rico.‡‡  On December 15th, 2016, we sent the email below to the one of the 
medical schools administrators (in most cases, the email was sent to the Associate Dean 
of Student Affairs):  
 
 
Dear [MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR], 
 
I am contacting you in your capacity as the [MEDICAL SCHOOL 
ADMINISTRATOR’S JOB TITLE] to ask if I might recruit your graduating medical 
students to a study on decision making in the residency match. Our study, which I am 
conducting in collaboration with Professor Alex Rees-Jones at the University of 
Pennsylvania, is aimed to help us understand how students think about the matching 
process, what common mistakes are made, and how to best design the advice that 
schools provide to their students as they go through this process. 
 
We are working to recruit medical students nationwide and would greatly appreciate 
your school's participation. All we are asking from you is permission to email a link to 
our survey to your students in February, right after the match. The survey should only 
take 10-20 minutes for students to complete and provides students with a chance to win 
prizes as compensation for their time. All responses would be anonymous and pose 
minimal risk to the student participants. 
 
Please let us know if we can answer any additional questions you have over email or 
over the phone. If you are interested, I would be happy to share the current draft of the 
survey. Furthermore, all materials will be approved by our Institutional Review Board, 
and we would be happy to provide the relevant documentation once it is finalized. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
 
Sincerely, 
Melissa Beswick 
Research Coordinator 
The Wharton School 
 
We sent the email below to medical school administrators who requested IRB 
documentation:  
 
Dear [MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR], 
  
                                                          
‡‡ We chose not to contact the medical schools in Canada because the majority of students graduating from 
Canadian medical schools do not participate in the NRMP.   
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I am writing to let you know that the IRB has reviewed our protocol and has given us 
approval to proceed. I have attached the relevant documentation. Our survey research 
is anonymized and poses no tangible threat to participants, so the IRB has determined 
that it does not require continued IRB oversight and is thus considered exempt. 
 
Now that you have this documentation, I wanted to confirm that you are able to 
participate and distribute this survey to your students. If so, I will be in touch in 
February to send the survey link. Who should I send this link to in February?  
Thank you again for considering our request.  
 
Best, 
Melissa Beswick 
Research Coordinator 
The Wharton School 
 
We sent a follow-up email to medical school administrators who had not 
responded to first email on January 17th, 2017.  It looked very similar to the first wave of 
emails. This wave was sent after our study received exempt status by the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Institutional Review Board.   
 
 
Dear [MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR], 
 
I am contacting you in your capacity as the [MEDICAL SCHOOL 
ADMINISTRATOR’S JOB TITLE] to ask if I might recruit your graduating medical 
students to a study on decision making in the residency match. Our study, which I am 
conducting in collaboration with Professor Alex Rees-Jones at the University of 
Pennsylvania, is aimed to help us understand how students think about the matching 
process, what common mistakes are made, and how to best design the advice that 
schools provide to their students as they go through this process. 
 
We are working to recruit medical students nationwide and would greatly appreciate 
your school's participation. All we are asking from you is permission to email a link to 
our survey to your students in February, right after students submit their match 
preferences but before they receive the results. The survey should only take 10-20 
minutes for students to complete and we compensate all participating students with an 
Amazon.com gift card valued between $5.00 and $50.00; the amount is contingent 
upon their survey performance. Additionally, we would be happy to send you resulting 
recommendations for medical advising and a copy of the academic paper. 
 
The University of Pennsylvania's Internal Review Board (IRB) has reviewed our 
protocol and has given us approval to proceed. Our survey research is anonymized and 
poses no tangible threat to participants, so the IRB has determined that it does not 
require continued IRB oversight and is thus considered exempt. 
 
Please let us know if we can answer any additional questions you have over email or 
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over the phone. If you are interested, I would be happy to share the current draft of the 
survey or documentation from the IRB. Thank you for your consideration. 
 
Sincerely, 
Melissa Beswick 
Research Coordinator 
The Wharton School 
 
Shortly after 9 PM on 2/22/17 (the deadline for medical students to submit their 
match preferences), we sent out the following email to the schools who had agreed to 
participate.  
 
Dear [MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR], 
 
Thank you again for agreeing to let us survey your medical students participating in the 
match. It is important for our study to survey students as soon as possible after they 
submit preferences to the NRMP, so we’d greatly appreciate if you could forward our 
recruitment email at your earliest convenience. It is included below. 
 
Please let me know once you have received this and contacted your students with the 
survey link. I would appreciate it if you could CC me on the email. I would be happy to 
answer any additional questions. Thank you. 
 
Best, 
Melissa Beswick 
Research Coordinator 
University of Pennsylvania   
 
Dear graduating medical student, 
 
You are being contacted because your school is participating in a study on the 
decision-making process of students in the NRMP match. If you participated in the 
2017 NRMP match, we would greatly appreciate your participation in our anonymous, 
10-minute survey. As a token of our appreciation, participants will earn an Amazon 
gift card voucher valued between $5.00 and $50.00; based on past versions of the 
study, we expect the average respondent will earn $21.00. 
The survey can be accessed here: [LINK]  
 
The results of this study will provide information on how medical students select 
residency programs and will assist in the advising and preparation of future generations 
of students. If you have any questions about this study, please contact Melissa Beswick 
at [ANONYMIZED]. 
 
We thank you and deeply appreciate your time and participation. 
 
Alex Rees-Jones, University of Pennsylvania 
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Sam Skowronek, University of Pennsylvania 
Melissa Beswick, University of Pennsylvania 
 
 
On 2/28/17, we sent out a follow-up email to the schools who had not yet made 
the survey live.   
 
Dear [MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR], 
 
Thank you again for agreeing to let us survey your medical students participating in the 
match. It is important for our study to survey students as soon as possible after they 
submit preferences to the NRMP, so we’d greatly appreciate if you could forward our 
recruitment email at your earliest convenience. It is included below. Do you think you 
will be able to distribute it soon? 
 
Please let me know once you have received this and contacted your students with the 
survey link. I would appreciate it if you could CC me on the email. I would be happy to 
answer any additional questions. 
 
Many thanks, 
Melissa Beswick 
Research Coordinator 
The Wharton School 
 
Dear graduating medical student, 
 
You are being contacted because your school is participating in a study on the 
decision-making process of students in the NRMP match. If you participated in the 
2017 NRMP match, we would greatly appreciate your participation in our anonymous, 
10-minute survey. As a token of our appreciation, participants will earn an Amazon 
gift card voucher valued between $5.00 and $50.00; based on past versions of the 
study, we expect the average respondent will earn $21.00. 
The survey can be accessed here: [LINK]  
 
The results of this study will provide information on how medical students select 
residency programs and will assist in the advising and preparation of future generations 
of students. If you have any questions about this study, please contact Melissa Beswick 
at [ANONYMIZED]. 
 
We thank you and deeply appreciate your time and participation. 
 
Alex Rees-Jones, University of Pennsylvania 
Sam Skowronek, University of Pennsylvania 
Melissa Beswick, University of Pennsylvania 
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Sample Exclusions  
Several observations were excluded from the dataset prior to data analysis. These 
exclusions were made in accordance with the authors’ pre-registration plan or general 
best practices of data cleaning.  
  
The following observations were excluded:   
1. Observations that represented participants’ survey responses after already 
participating once.  
2. Observations that represented demonstrable nefarious behavior. 
3. Observations that represented participants’ incomplete survey responses.  
4. Observations recorded by participants who indicated that they did not participate 
in the 2017 NRMP match. 
5. Participants who spent an insufficient amount of time on the incentivized exercise 
pages. 
6. Observations recorded during an Amazon Web Service outage.  
 
Table S4 presents the number of observations excluded by each participating medical 
school. 
 
Multiple observations from the same participant. Participants answered two surveys in 
this experiment. The first survey contained all questions related to our hypotheses. 
Participants were automatically passed to a second survey with a separate url. Here, 
participants were informed of their match result in the incentivized simulation and 
provided their email address in order to receive the monetary bonus from their match. 
The two-survey design allowed us to assure participants that their email addresses would 
not be linked to their responses in the final experimental dataset. For clarity of exposition, 
we refer to the first survey as the experimental survey and the second survey as the 
reward survey.  
Upon investigation, the reward survey dataset contained 40 email addresses with 
multiple observations; we temporarily matched these 40 email addresses to their 
experimental survey response and deleted duplicate observations.§§ Thirty-four of these 
email addresses were observed twice and six email addresses were observed three times. 
In the decision rules that follow, we call participants second and third participations 
recorded in the reward survey “participant’s duplicate observations” for parsimony.  
The goal of this cleaning procedure was to exclude duplicate experimental survey 
observations. To do so, we first generated a variable that flagged the chronological order 
in which each participant who submitted one of the 40 email addresses took the survey.  
Using IP addresses, we excluded participants’ second and third participations in the 
experimental survey using the following decision rules. (See fig. S2 for a graphical 
depiction of decision rules):  
 
                                                          
§§ Duplicate email addresses recorded in the reward survey need not represent nefarious behavior nor 
necessitate that the same participant took the experimental survey more than once. If participants refreshed 
their web browser while the reward survey data was being recorded by the survey software (possibility 
because of a slow internet connection), their reward survey response would be recorded twice but their 
experimental survey response recorded only once. 
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1. If the IP address of participants’ duplicate observations does not exist in the 
experimental survey, we did nothing. 
 
2. If the IP address of participants’ duplicate observations exists in the experimental 
survey once, we checked to see if the start date/time of the duplicate observations 
matched the end date/time of the corresponding observations in the experimental 
survey. If these timestamps could not be matched, we checked that the school   
that the participant matched with was constant across the duplicate responses and 
the corresponding observations in the experimental survey. If these criteria were 
met, we excluded this observation from the experimental survey. If these criteria 
were not met, we did nothing. 
 
3. If the IP address of participants’ duplicate responses exists in the experimental 
survey more than once, we matched these observation based on the criteria 
articulated in point two and excluded observations accordingly.  
 
Using this procedure, we successfully identified the duplicate observations in the 
experimental survey and excluded them. 
In total, 22 observations were excluded (Table S4, column 3). 
 
Nefarious behavior. We actively monitored the completion of surveys throughout the 
sampling period, attempting to identify repeat-observations like those discussed above 
before payments were issued. On March 1, we noticed a sudden spike in survey-
completion-activity from one participating medical school. Further, only five of the 43 
observations collected contained a school-affiliated email address. Eight of these 
observations had previously been excluded based on the “Multiple observations from the 
same participant” criteria outlined above. Only the five observations that provided a 
school-affiliated email address were retained for analysis.  
In total, 24 observations were excluded (Table S4, column 4), due to our strong belief 
that these represented attempts to “farm” the survey. 
 
Incomplete responses. We excluded 640 observations because they were incomplete 
(Table S4, column 5). 
 
Non-participants of the 2017 NRMP match. Our recruitment materials explicitly 
requested only participants in the 2017 NRMP match, but nevertheless we expected to 
have some non-participants click through into our survey. The first question participants 
were asked in our survey was whether they participated in the 2017 NRMP match. By 
design, those who indicated they did not participate were removed from the survey and 
did not answer any further questions.  
In total, 20 observations were excluded for this reason (Table S4, column 6).  
 
Insufficient Time. In accordance with our pre-registration plan, we excluded participants 
who spent less than 30 seconds combined on the page that explained the instructions of 
the hypothetical match and the page in which participants submitted their hypothetical 
rank ordering. This exclusion was made in order to exclude participants who do not pay 
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attention to the information necessary to thoughtfully respond to our simulated matching 
exercise.  
In total, 58 observations were excluded for this reason (Table S4, column 7). 
 
Amazon Web Service outage. On February 28th at 10:45am, Amazon Web Services 
(AWS) crashed. This affected participants’ ability to complete the survey. For example, 
many participants reported that they were unable to see the Raven’s Matrices during this 
time. By 2:13pm, we closed all active surveys and did not reopen them until AWS was 
back online later that evening. We excluded all observations recorded between 10:45am 
and 3:00 pm on February 28th due to the high occurrence of survey errors during this time 
window.  
In total 159 observations were excluded (Table S4, column 8). 
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Free Response Analysis 
 
When participants indicated which sources provided them with advice about their 
NRMP submission, we asked them to explain what advice they received from each. We 
placed no restrictions or requirements on participants’ responses; therefore, not all 
participants who received advice from a given source wrote a response. In total, we 
collected 2,960 free-responses, where 76.2% of our sample wrote at least one free 
response. The average number of words per response was 14.22 (SD=14.28).  
We developed 36 items to code each free response (See table S7).  Items 1-13 
identified what advice participants received,  items 14-22 identified who (or what) 
provided advice to participants and items 23-36 identified through what medium(s) 
advice was conveyed.   
Four research assistants (RAs) independently coded responses on all 36 items, and 
each response was coded by two RAs. All items were coded on a binary scale where the 
free response was given the value one if the participant explicitly mentioned the content 
of the item and zero if not. When the RAs disagreed on an item, a fifth RA was brought 
in to break the tie. All RAs were blind to hypotheses.  
  
37 
 
Survey Screenshots 
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If the participant clicked on the link to the NRMP website, they were directed to the 
example presented on the NRMP website that illustrates, using 4 medical students and 3 
residencies, how matches are determined.  All participants proceeded to the following 
page.  
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Participant who were not randomized to indicate the residency where they expected to 
match saw the following page: 
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Participants who were randomized to indicate the residency where they expected to 
match saw the following page: 
 
  
42 
 
 All participants then proceeded to the following pages. 
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[We used seven matrices (matrices 1, 2, 3, 4, 26, 29, and 31) from the Advanced 
Progressive Matrices Set II booklet for this study. Due to copyright laws, we are unable 
to post these specific matrices. Below is a sample of a Raven’s matrix. This matrix was 
not used in our study. To see the matrices used for this study, you will need to purchase 
the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices Kit published by Pearson Education.] 
  
1 32
4 65
 
  
48 
 
  
49 
 
  
50 
 
  
51 
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Simulation of Match Results: 
 
Final matches in our experiment were determined by combining the participants’ reported 
preferences with those of 49 simulated students and 5 simulated residency programs.  
 
Preferences held by other students were simulated assuming optimal preference 
reporting.  
 
Preferences held by residency programs were simulated as follows. We assigned a 
random valuation for each of the 49 simulated students, drawn independently and 
uniformly from the intergers spanning 0 to 99, inclusive. The valuation for the participant 
was set to be their HST score. Preferences were then formed by sorting this valuation 
number from largest to smallest. The same preference order applied to all five residency 
programs.  
 
This simulation of residency preferences may be thought of in the context of a random 
utility model. Consider the case where valuations are determined by combining HST 
scores with a random error term, meant to capture other valued features of an application. 
Denote this valuation of student i as 𝑉𝑖
1 = 𝐻𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖. Since preference orderings are 
invariant to adding a constant to the utility function, we may equivalently rationalize 
residency preferences with the valuation function 𝑉𝑖
2 = 𝐻𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 − 𝜀𝑠, where 𝜀𝑠 is the 
random error draw for the non-simulated match participant. Our preference simulation 
procedure can be interpreted as sorting on values of  𝑉𝑖
2, where the random draws 
assigned to the 49 simulated students correspond to draws from the distribution of 
𝐻𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 − 𝜀𝑠. We randomly sample this final value, rather than the individual 
components, to minimize the computation necessary in each run of the simulation. 
 
With these estimates in hand, and assumed class-sizes of 10 for each program, we run the 
deferred acceptance algorithm as described in (15).   
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Preregistration Document 
 
As Predicted: "Rees-Jones Skowronek NRMP Study" (#3109) 
Created: 02/21/2017 02:21 PM (PT)  
 
Author(s) 
Alexander Rees-Jones (Wharton) - alre@wharton.upenn.edu 
Samuel Skowronek (Wharton) - samsko@wharton.upenn.edu 
 
1) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study? 
A great deal of care has gone into designing matching mechanisms that make it incentive 
compatible for participants to truthfully report their preferences. The National Residency 
Match Program (NRMP), which matches nearly all graduating medical students in North 
America to residency programs, is arguably the most important application of this 
mechanism. However, recent work (e.g., Rees-Jones 2016) suggests that at least some 
students try to “game the system” in these settings, despite the futility of such efforts. 
This project aims to better understand why medical students misrepresent their 
preferences in matching mechanisms. We test whether: 
 
H1) Expectations: That propensity to misrepresent preferences is driven by a desire to 
match to the residency program that the student expected to match with ex ante (leading 
students to list an attainable option as their “first choice”).  
 
H2) Advice: That propensity to misrepresent preferences is driven by the advice (or lack 
thereof) the student received from his/her medical school, other medical students, and the 
NRMP website.  
 
H3) Competition in match: That propensity to misrepresent preferences is driven by a 
perceived need to seek a competitive advantage when a student knows they are an 
undesirable match participant (e.g., due to low standardize test scores).  
 
H4) Reasoning ability: That propensity to misrepresent preferences is driven by 
differences in logical reasoning ability.  
 
H5) Overconfidence: That propensity to misrepresent preferences is driven by 
overconfidence.  
 
H6) Trust: That propensity to misrepresent preferences is driven by mistrust of other 
market participants. 
 
2) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured. 
In our study, we have one primary and one secondary dependent variable. 
 
In this study, participants are presented with a hypothetical residency matching exercise. 
They could match with one of five programs, and their compensation for the survey 
depends on which program they match to. They are then asked to submit their preference 
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ordering over the programs, which we input to the matching mechanism. Our primary 
DV is an indicator of whether or not the participant submitted a “truthful” ranking of the 
schools. If they ranked the programs in order of their compensation, we code it as 
truthful. If they did not, we code it as nontruthful.  
 
In a later section of our study, participants are asked whether or not the rank-ordered lists 
(ROL) that they submitted to the NRMP is an exact ordering of their true preferences. In 
contrast to our primary measure above, which is an incentivized measure of 
understanding, this measure is merely an unincentivized self-report. We therefore view 
our experimental measure as our DV of primary interest; however, we collect this 
secondary DV to assist in validating those results.  
 
3) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to? 
Participants will be randomly assigned to either the expectation or the no-expectation 
condition.  
 
Participants assigned to the expectation condition will be asked, in the hypothetical 
matching exercise, to state what residency program they expect to match with before they 
rank order their preferences. Participants assigned to the no-expectation condition with 
not make this prediction before they rank order their preferences. This provides us with a 
means to test H1. 
 
Furthermore, all participants will be randomly assigned a standardized test percentile 
score (1-99). They are told that this is the test score they would submit to the programs in 
the hypothetical matching exercise, providing us with a means to test H3. 
 
4) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main 
question/hypothesis. 
We will test each of the 6 hypotheses described above by examining differences in the 
rate of truthful reporting in the primary and secondary dependent variables. The tests of 
each hypothesis are: 
 
H1: Expectations 
• Assessing difference in DV across the expectation condition. (Preferred test: differences 
in proportions) 
 
H2: Advice 
• Assessing difference in DV depending on the presence of each measured source of 
advice. (Preferred test: logit predicting truthful reporting on self-reported receipt of 
advice from other students, participants’ medical school, the NRMP, and other sources) . 
 
H3: Competition in match  
• Assessing difference in DV depending on random assignment to the hypothetical test 
score. (Preferred test: logit predicting truthful reporting with continuous test score) 
 
H4: Reasoning ability 
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• Assessing difference in DV depending on differences in logical reasoning measured by 
Raven’s Matrices. (Preferred test: logit predicting truthful reporting with number of 
correct Raven’s Matrices). 
 
H5: Overconfidence 
• Assessing difference in DV depending on differences in overconfidence measured by 
the participants’ forecast of their performance on the Raven’s Matrices compared to 
others. (Preferred test: two sample difference of proportions, split by whether or not the 
participant over- or under- estimated his performance) 
 
H6: Trust 
• Assessing difference in DV depending on provision of advice from all measured 
sources. (Preferred test: logit predicting truthful reporting based on self-reported trust of 
the NRMP, other students, and residency programs). 
 
In addition to these tests which individually assess each of the hypotheses above, we will 
run analyses where we predict our primary DV with all measures described above. Our 
preferred specification will be logit regression, although we will run OLS regressions as 
robustness checks.  
 
We will also test the correlation between the primary and secondary DVs.  
 
5) Any secondary analyses? 
• We will compare the propensity to expect to match to the first-ranked school submitted 
to the NRMP, split by self-reported truth-telling status. (Auxillary test of H1: 
Expectations) 
• Assessing difference in DV depending on MCAT scores. Note that this conflates two 
things that are disentangled in our experimental design: underlying “ability” as well as 
one’s competitive position in the market. (Preferred test: logit predicting truthful 
reporting with continuous test score) (Auxillary test of H3: Competition in match and H4: 
Reasoning ability) 
• Assessing difference in DV depending on differences in overconfidence measured by 
participants’ estimate of their MCAT performance relative to others who took the MCAT 
that year. (Preferred test: two sample difference of proportions, split by whether or not 
the participant over- or under- estimated his performance) (Auxillary test of H5: 
Overconfidence) 
• We will test for gender differences in propensity to misrepresent preferences. The small 
amount of existing research on the topic suggests that men are more likely to 
misrepresent their preferences in this environment than women.  
 
 
6) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? 
No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the number will be 
determined. 
We are recruiting from a sample of approximately 4,000 medical students. Past research 
in this area has recruited approximately 20% of similar samples. We therefore expect 
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approximately 800 participants. However, we will make use of any responses received 
during our sampling window. 
 
7) Anything else you would like to pre-register?  
(e.g., data exclusions, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses 
planned?) 
We are collecting data on participants’ age, but do not have any ex ante hypotheses about 
this component. It is collected for standard demographic reporting.  
 
We will exclude participants who spend less than 30 seconds combined on the page that 
explains the instructions of the hypothetical match and the page in which participants 
submit their hypothetical rank ordering. This exclusion is made in order to exclude 
participants who do not pay attention to the information necessary to thoughtfully answer 
our primary dependent variable.  
 
8) Have any data been collected for this study already? 
No, no data have been collected for this study yet 
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Fig. S1. Geographic Location of Participating and Non-participating Medical 
Schools.  Circles represent the 143 U.S. medical schools with full accreditation from the 
Association of American Medical Colleges at the time of our study. Circles in black 
represent medical schools that participated in our study. Circles in grey represent medical 
schools that did not participate in our study. 
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Fig. S2. Decision Rules for Excluding Multiple Observations from the Same Participant. 
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Fig. S3. Frequency of Missing Programs in Shortened Submissions. Shown is a 
histogram of the programs participants removed conditional on submitting a shortened 
rank-order list (N=141) in the incentivized measure of performance. Bars show the 
number of participants that removed each program from their ROL. For example, 20 
participants who shortened their preferences removed the highest valued program from 
their rank-order list. These participants may also have removed other programs as well—
a participant who dropped multiple programs will appear in multiple bins.  
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Fig. S4. The Number of Misordered Residency Pairs Submitted During Suboptimal 
Play. Shown is a histogram of the number of misordered pairs in each participants’ ROL. 
All participants who misrepresented their preferences (N=399) are presented. For each 
participant, we consider each binary comparison of programs inherent in their preference 
list (e.g., comparing program 1 to program 2, comparing program 1 to program 3, etc.), 
and count the number of pairwise rankings misordered in terms of compensation.  
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Fig. S5. An Individual-Level Analysis of the Consequence of Suboptimal Play.  
Shown are three figures that illustrate how suboptimal play changed the match results at 
the individual level. The pie charts in Panels B and C  present data for participants who 
submitted suboptimal ROLs (N=399).  Panel B shows the number of more profitable 
programs ranked below participants’ ultimate match—each of which creates a foregone 
opportunity for higher earnings in the experiment. To illustrate by example, participants 
who matched to Elm South ($15) could only lose money by misrepresentation if they 
ranked the $25 or the $50 program below Elm South. In Panel B we tally the number of 
these foregone options for each respondent who misrepresented preferences. Of course, 
given a participants’ HST score, different foregone options have different probabilities of 
being obtainable: a low-HST applicant is unlikely to be admitted by the best program, 
and thus failing to rank it has a relatively low chance of being consequential. Panel C 
represents the probability that each respondent faced of matching to one of their foregone 
options. Estimates are derived from four logit models (presented in panel A), each 
predicting if a truthtelling respondent could have been admitted to each program based on 
a cubic spline over HST scores. Note that all respondents have a 100% probability of 
being admissible by the omitted, lowest-paying program.   
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Fig. S6. Experimental Behavior by Length of NRMP Submission. This figure plots 
the propensity to submit truthful, permuted, or shortened ROLs in our simulated 
residency match, as a function of the number of programs listed in the participant’s real 
NRMP submission. Plotted are the results of three separate OLS regressions in which the 
number of programs that participants ranked in their NRMP submission is the sole 
predictor. We regressed this categorical variable on participants’ likelihood to tell the 
truth, to shorten their ROL, and to permute their ROL in the simulated match. The 
triangle-pointed line shows the percent of participants who told the truth in the simulated 
match at each length of participants’ NRMP ROL. The circle-pointed line and the square-
pointed line show the percent of participants who shortened and permuted their 
preferences, respectively. In support of the external validity of our experimental measure, 
participants who shortened their ROL in the NRMP submission are more likely to shorten 
their ROL in the simulated match. Participants who both permuted and shortened their 
preferences (1.6% of total sample) are represented in both the circle-pointed and square-
pointed lines. Vertical lines at each data point show 95% confidence intervals. 
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Fig. S7. Predictors of Self-reported Truth-telling Status. Plotted are estimated average 
marginal effects derived from a logit model predicting participants’ self-reported truthful 
preferences to the NRMP. Panel A presents estimates obtained from the complete model, 
including the entire battery of predictors. Panel B presents the estimate for each 
univariate model, predicting self-reported truth-telling with only the single variable 
represented in that row. Participants’ HST score and Raven’s performance are 
normalized. All other measures are binary. For full descriptions of each predictor, see 
section II.B of the paper. Horizontal lines at each data point show 95% confidence. 
 Self-reported truthtelling status is measured by the yes/no response to the survey 
question: “When forming the ranking of residencies to submit to the NRMP, some 
candidates submit an ordering that is not the true order of how desirable they find the 
programs. When forming your list, did you report the exact ordering of your true 
preferences?” For comparability across studies, this phrasing was drawn from earlier 
work documenting self-reported misrepresentation in the match (11). This previous work 
argues that self-reports are likely to underestimate the rate of misrepresentation due to 
social-desirability biases, and documents that some respondents interpret the term “true 
preferences” in a manner inconsistent with economists usage of the term. Interpretation 
of the above results should be conducted with these caveats in mind. 
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Fig. S8. The Types of Advice Participants Received. Participants’ free responses were coded to detect 13 different types of advice. 
Presented are the frequencies of each type of advice participants received by the source that provided the advice. All data is presented 
when participants received more than one type of advice from the same source. For coding details, see table S7: numbers in 
parentheses correspond to the item number in that table. 
 
  
65 
 
 
 
Fig. S9. Providers of Good and Bad Advice. Shown is the percent of good advice and 
bad advice participants report receiving from each source, conditional on receiving 
advice from that source. Six hundred ninety six participants (40.6% of sample) indicated 
receiving advice from the NRMP website, 404 participants (23.6% of sample) indicated 
receiving advice from other sources, 1,067 participants (62.3% of sample) indicated 
receiving advice from other medical students, and 1,227 (62.3% of sample) indicated 
receiving advice from their medical school. 
Good Advice: We classify participants as having received good advice from a 
source when they received advice that explained how the algorithm works, that the 
algorithm is student optimal, that they should rank order programs based on their true 
preferences, or that they should rank all programs at which they interviewed. (Items 1, 2, 
3, and 4 in table S7). 
Bad Advice: We classify participants as having received bad advice from a source 
if they were advised to not rank “reach” programs, not rank programs they did not want 
to attend, not waste the top spots of their rank order list on “reach” programs, or over-
rank programs that tell them they will be ranked highly (Items 5, 6, 7, and 8 in table S7). 
Both Good & Bad Advice: We classify participants as having received both good 
and bad advice if their free response was coded as containing at least one Good Advice 
item and one Bad Advice item. 
Neither: We classify participants as having received neither good nor bad advice 
if their free response was coded as containing none of the Good Advice or Bad Advice 
items.  
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Fig. S10. The Media That Sources Used to Provide Advice to NRMP Participants. 
Participants’ free responses were coded to detect nine different mediums through which 
participants received advice. This figure shows the frequencies that each medium was 
used to provide advice to participants. All mediums are counted when participants 
indicated that they received advice via multiple mediums from the same source. Free 
response prompts slightly varied by source. In particular, we explicitly asked participants 
to discuss how they received advice from their medical school. We did not attempt to 
elicit this information in the other three free response prompts. This explains, in part, why 
emails, in-person meetings and lectures are the modal mediums through which advice 
was provided. For coding details, see table S7: numbers in parentheses correspond to the 
item number in that table. 
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Fig. S11. Providers of Advice. Participants’ free responses were coded to detect 14 
different sources that provided advice to participants. This figure shows the number of 
free responses that mention each source. Only one source per participant-free-response 
observation is counted when participants indicated that they received advice via multiple 
sources in a single free response entry. Note that the free response prompts slightly varied 
by source. In particular, we explicitly asked participants to discuss who provided them 
with advice from their medical school and from other sources. We did not attempt to 
elicit this kind of information in the other two free response prompts. This explains, in 
part, why medical school affiliated sources are the modal sources of advice and why the 
NRMP is so infrequently mentioned. For coding details, see table S7: numbers in 
parentheses correspond to the item number in that table. 
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Fig. S12. Source Influence. Plotted are estimated percentages derived from a logit model 
predicting participants’ likelihood to truthfully report preferences based on four 
categorical variables. These variables represent the level of influence each source of 
advice had on participants NRMP rank order list. After indicating which sources 
provided participants with advice, participants rank ordered each of these sources by the 
level of influence they exerted on their NRMP submission. Vertical lines at each data 
point show 95% confidence intervals.  
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Table S1.  Participating Medical Schools and Response Rates. The Response Rate 
shows completed responses divided by number of graduates. The denominator is the 
number of eligible respondents (i.e., the number of students participating in the 2017 
NRMP Match).  
 
 
 
State 
 
 
University 
 
Graduates in 
Class 2017 
 
Completed 
Responses 
 
Response Rate 
1 Indiana Indiana University 328 168 51.22% 
2 Florida University of South Florida 162 140 86.42% 
3 Texas Texas Southwestern University 227 139 61.23% 
4 Massachusetts Tufts University 216 105 48.61% 
5 Washington D.C. The George Washington University 181 101 55.80% 
6 Ohio The Ohio State University  168 99 58.93% 
7 Missouri Saint Louis University 181 98 54.14% 
8 Wisconsin University of Wisconsin 171 79 46.20% 
9 North Carolina Wake Forest University 116 79 68.10% 
10 California University of California, San Diego 129 76 58.91% 
11 Florida University of Central Florida 113 72 63.72% 
12 Nebraska University of Nebraska 124 63 50.81% 
13 Oklahoma University of Oklahoma 157 60 38.22% 
14 New York University of Rochester 100 56 56.00% 
15 New Jersey Rowan University 57 47 82.46% 
16 Illinois Southern Illinois University 64 44 68.75% 
17 South Carolina University of South Carolina 86 42 48.84% 
18 Alabama University of South Alabama 70 41 58.57% 
19 Michigan Central Michigan University 62 38 61.29% 
20 Connecticut University of Connecticut 90 34 37.78% 
21 Colorado University of Colorado 155 33 21.29% 
22 South Dakota University of South Dakota 53 29 54.72% 
23 Virginia Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University (Virginia Tech) 
41 26 63.41% 
24 Georgia Mercer University 113 24 21.24% 
25 Texas Texas Tech University 136 21 15.44% 
  Total 3300 1714 51.94 
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Table S2: Characteristics of Participating and Non-participating Medical Schools. 
We draw programs’ information from the 2016 U.S. News & World Report database. 
This database contains demographic information for 93.9% (N=138) of all AAMC 
accredited medical schools in the United States and Puerto Rico, and all medical schools 
that participated in this study. Means are calculated after dropping schools with missing 
data. The “NR rate” shows the percentage of schools with missing data. The right-most 
column shows the p value of a two-sample t-test by participation status. Standard errors 
are in parentheses.    
 
   
 
 
All 
Programs 
 
 
Non-
Participating 
Programs 
 
 
 
Participating 
Programs 
 
 
P-value of Difference 
By Participation Status 
Total Enrollment Mean 640.19 
(22.480) 
634.84 
(24.602) 
663.53  
(56.046) 
0.622 
NR rate 26.09% 
(0.038) 
26.55%  
(0.042) 
24.00%  
(0.087) 
0.795 
 
MCAT 
Composite 
Mean 32.09  
(0.255) 
32.15  
(0.304) 
31.84  
(0.353) 
0.644 
NR rate 26.81% 
(0.038) 
27.43%  
(0.042) 
24.0%  
(0.087) 
0.728 
 
Average 
Undergraduate 
GPA 
Mean 3.74  
(0.009) 
3.74 
 (0.010) 
3.74  
(0.020) 
0.839 
NR rate 26.09% 
(0.038) 
26.55%  
(0.042) 
24.00%  
(0.087) 
0.795 
Acceptance Rate Mean 5.72  
(0.300) 
5.74  
(0.330) 
5.66  
(0.738) 
0.916 
NR rate 26.09% 
(0.038) 
26.55%  
(0.042) 
24.00%  
(0.087) 
0.795 
U.S. News 
Research 
Ranking 
Mean 43.55  
(2.667) 
41.86  
(3.067) 
50.59  
(4.956) 
0.198 
NR rate 36.23% 
(0.041) 
37.17%  
(0.046) 
32.00%  
(0.095) 
0.630 
Percent Female Mean 46.50% 
(0.006) 
46.62%  
(0.006) 
45.94%  
(0.012) 
0.637 
NR rate 4.35%  
(0.017) 
4.42%  
(0.019) 
4.00% 
 (0.040) 
0.926 
Observations  138 113 25  
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Table S3.  Participant Demographics & Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean SD 
Demographics and Respondent Characteristics   
Gender (female=1) 0.48 0.500 
   
Age (years) 27.20 3.628 
   
Participated in Couples Match (Yes=1) 0.11 0.318 
Year MCAT was Taken 2011.35 1.308 
Followed NRMP Training Link Provided in Experiment 0.09 0.293 
Summary Statistics    
# of Correctly Answered Raven's Matrices 4.44 1.292 
Overconfidence in Raven's Performance 0.69 0.462 
MCAT Score 31.86 3.756 
   
Overconfidence in MCAT Performance 0.12 0.330 
Received Advice from the NRMP Website 0.41 0.491 
Received Advice from Medical Students 0.62 0.485 
Received Advice from Medical School 0.72 0.451 
Received Advice from Other Sources 0.24 0.425 
Trust in Other Medical Students to Submit Truthful 
ROL 
0.37 0.482 
Trust in Residency Programs to Evaluate Students 
Fairly 
0.58 0.494 
Trust in the NRMP to Run the Algorithm Honestly 0.97 0.162 
Observations 1714  
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Table S4: Exclusions Prior to Data Analysis. Presented are the observations excluded by each exclusion criteria across participating 
medical schools. Detailed descriptions of each criteria are listed in the Sample Exclusions subsection of Methods and Materials 
section of this document. Numbers in parentheses correspond to the column numbers. Column 9 shows the total number of excluded 
observations made at each medical school. Column 10 shows the data recovered after all exclusions.  
 
 
(1) 
Medical School 
 
(2) 
Sample 
Collected 
 
 
(3) 
Duplicates 
 
(4) 
Nefarious 
Behavior 
 
(5) 
Incomplete 
responses  
(6)  
‘17 NRMP 
Non- 
Participation   
 
 
(7) 
Timing  
 
 
(8) 
AWS  
 
(9) 
Total 
Exclusions  
 
(10) 
Analyzed 
Sample  
Central Michigan 46 0 0 6 0 0 2 8 38 
Colorado 133 3 0 25 0 9 63 100 33 
GW 129 0 0 21 4 3 0 28 101 
Indiana 249 0 0 70 2 3 6 81 168 
Mercer 72 0 0 27 1 2 18 48 24 
Nebraska 76 0 0 8 1 1 3 13 63 
Ohio State 124 0 0 22 0 2 1 25 99 
Oklahoma 72 0 0 11 0 1 0 12 60 
Rochester 68 0 0 8 0 0 4 12 56 
Rowan 87 0 0 37 0 2 1 40 47 
Saint Louis 188 8 24 53 0 3 2 90 98 
South Alabama 49 0 0 7 0 1 0 8 41 
South Carolina 49 0 0 4 2 1 0 7 42 
South Dakota 32 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 29 
Southern Illinois 54 2 0 7 0 1 0 10 44 
Texas Southwestern 220 0 0 67 3 7 4 81 139 
Texas Tech 45 0 0 3 0 1 20 24 21 
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Table S4 Continued          
Tufts 131 1 0 22 1 1 1 26 105 
UCF 95 0 0 21 0 1 1 23 72 
UConn 92 0 0 26 0 5 27 48 34 
UCSD 93 0 0 16 0 1 0 27 76 
USF 280 4 0 123 3 10 0 140 140 
Virginia Tech 43 2 0 8 0 1 6 17 26 
Wake Forest 121 2 0 35 3 2 0 42 79 
Wisconsin 89 0 0 10 0 0 0 10 79 
Total 2637 22 24 640 20 58 159 923 1714 
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Table S5. Suboptimal Play and Loss of Earnings.  Shown are the average dollar 
amounts participants earned for submitting optimal and suboptimal rank order lists in the 
simulated match. As in Figure 3, we show average earnings for each decile of 
participants’ randomly assigned HST score. Column 6 shows the differences in mean 
earnings derived from a two-sample t-test. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
(1) 
Assigned HST 
Score Decile 
 
 
(2) 
Sample 
Size 
(3) 
Percent of Participants 
Who Submitted 
Optimal ROLs 
(%) 
(4) 
Earnings From 
Suboptimal 
Behavior 
($) 
(5) 
Earnings From 
Optimal 
Behavior 
($) 
 
(6) 
Differences 
in Earnings 
($) 
      
1 174 72.41 7.24 7.90 -0.66*** 
     (0.169) 
      
2 185 71.35 8.25 9.05 -0.80*** 
     (0.213) 
      
3 161 76.40 9.61 10.28 -0.68 
     (0.356) 
      
4 167 71.86 11.97 12.13 -0.16 
     (0.430) 
      
5 171 77.19 14.49 15.11 -0.63 
     (0.621) 
      
6 171 75.44 18.99 18.72 0.27 
     (0.909) 
      
7 181 75.14 23.67 26.73 -3.06* 
     (1.456) 
      
8 168 80.95 29.06 32.54 -3.47 
     (2.326) 
      
9 186 86.02 37.12 42.19 -5.07* 
     (2.508) 
      
10 150 80.67 42.24 48.35 -6.11*** 
     (1.571) 
      
Total 1714 76.72 18.20 22.80 -4.60*** 
     (0.847) 
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Table S6. Model with All Receipt-of-Advice Predictors. Shown are the estimated 
average marginal effects derived from a logit model predicting truth-telling in the 
experimental task from the four measures of receiving advice. All predictors are binary. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Average Marginal Effects (SE) 
  
Received Advice from Medical Students -0.01 
 (0.023) 
  
Received Advice from Medical School 0.04 
 (0.026) 
  
Received Advice from the NRMP Website 0.10*** 
 (0.021) 
  
Received Advice from Other Sources 0.07** 
 (0.023) 
Observations 1714 
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Table S7: Free Responses Coding Items. All free responses were coded on the 36 items 
presented in this table. All items were coded on a binary scale. Columns 1 and 2 list the item 
number and label which are referenced in figs. S8-S11. Column 3 defines each item. Column 4 
lists the exact language that the research assistants were provided to code each free response. 
Column 5 shows an example of a free response that was coded as including the content of the 
item. See Free Response subsection in the Methods and Materials section of this document for 
more details on the coding procedure. 
     
(1) 
Item # 
(2) 
Item Label 
(3) 
Item Definition 
(4) 
Coding Definition 
(5) 
Example 
1. Tell the truth Participant received 
advice to tell the truth to 
the NRMP. 
Tell the truth?  
(e.g., "Rank programs 
 by preference") 
“Rank programs based on true 
preferences” 
2. 
 
Rank all 
programs 
The participant received 
advice to rank all of the 
programs at which they 
interviewed. 
Rank all programs 
  (e.g., “rank every 
program”,  “apply 
broadly") 
“…List ALL programs where you 
would be willing to attend “ 
3. The algorithm is 
student optimal 
The participant was told 
that the algorithm used by 
the NRMP is applicant 
proposing. 
Student optimal 
 (e.g., “the system 
works  
in favor of students") 
“The algorithm is designed in the 
applicants favor...” 
4. How the 
algorithm works 
The source provided 
information to the 
participant about how the 
algorithm works. 
Informed how algo 
works 
“The website provided a thorough 
example and explanation of how 
the algorithm works” 
5. Don't rank 
reaches 
The participant received 
advice to not rank the 
programs that they do not 
expect to be admitted to. 
Don't rank places 
 you cannot get into 
“…Rank places you most likely 
won’t match at and put them in the 
2nd and 3rd position and rank 
something you could possibly 
match at as number 1” 
6. Don't settle The participant was 
advised to not rank 
programs that they would 
not want to attend. 
Don't rank places you 
 don't want to go 
“Rank only programs you’d be 
happy matching at...” 
7. Don't waste top 
picks 
The participant was 
advised to rank programs 
they expected to match 
with at the top or their 
ROL. 
Don't rank highly 
places you cannot get 
into 
“Don’t rank too many ‘reach’ 
schools in the top 3” 
8. Rank programs 
that like you. 
The participant was 
advised to rank programs 
that informed them that 
they were liked by the 
program. 
Rank highly schools 
that tell me they like me 
“…rank certain places higher that 
said they ranked you highly.” 
9. Use external 
standards 
The participant was 
advised to rank programs 
based on an external 
standard of quality. 
Rank based on other 
external standards  
(e.g., "Droximity 
reports/rankings")*** 
“To Rank programs based on their 
doximity rank as opposed to which 
program I liked the best.” 
                                                          
*** Droximity is a website that ranks residency programs based on various program characteristics similar to the way 
US News & World Report ranks undergraduate universities. 
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10. Advice on 
couples match 
The participant received 
advice about the couples 
match. 
Mention couples match “Online resources said that in the 
couples match is can be hard to 
navigate both partners' 
preferences” 
11. How to form 
preferences 
The participant was 
advised on how to form 
their preferences. 
Statement about how to 
form preferences 
“Consider future career plans, 
geographic location, 
competitiveness, how you meshed 
with the residents, and strengths of 
the program…” 
12. Not informative The participant was 
provided platitudinous or 
nonsensical advice about 
the NRMP process. 
non-informative (e.g., 
"go with gut", "do what 
you feel is right") 
“Follow your heart!” 
13. Other (advice) The participant was given 
advice that did not fall 
into any of the above 12 
items. 
Other advice “I met with my advisors was given 
advice on strength of programs…” 
14. Email The participant received 
an email about the NRMP. 
Email “received emails and was 
recommended to read a blog 
written by medical school faculty” 
15. In-person 
meetings 
The participant met with 
at least one individual, in 
person, to discuss the 
NRMP. 
One-on-one meetings “I met with my advisory dean, 
along with 2 specialty advisors” 
16. Lectures The participant attended a 
lecture that discussed the 
NRMP. 
symposium 
 (large 
meetings/lecture) 
“I attended a talk given by the 
dean regarding what types of 
programs to apply to…and how to 
apply to them” 
17. Online forums The participant used 
online forums and 
message boards to learn 
about the NRMP. 
Message-boards 
/ forums 
“I used SDN forums to read about 
people's experiences with the 
match/interviewing in current and 
past years. …” 
18. Online blogs The participant used 
online blogs or videos to 
learn about the NRMP. 
Blogs, videos “I watched the video on the stable 
marriage algorithm in order to 
understand how the NRMP runs its 
algorithm…” 
19. Other websites The participant used 
websites unaffiliated with 
the NRMP or the AAMC 
to learn about the NRMP. 
Other websites “EMRA, AAFP, Doximity. These 
were all opinion pieces but 
provided concepts for considering 
rank list.”††† 
20. Other mediums The participant used other 
mediums not specified in 
items 14-19, 21, or 22 to 
gather information about 
the NRMP. 
other mediums “Doximetry newsletter. They said 
that it is mostly about geography 
and going with your gut….” 
21. Unspecified 
modules 
The participant used 
online learning modules to 
learn about the NRMP. 
Unspecified modules “A self-learning module was 
provided to us explaining the 
match algorithm and how to rank 
programs.” 
                                                          
††† The Emergency Medical Residency Association (EMRA) and The American Academy of 
Family Physicians (AAFP) are websites designed to provide medical students, residents, and 
physicians information about emergency medicine and family medicine, respectively.    
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22. Websites 
affiliated with 
the NRMP 
The participant gathered 
information about the 
NRMP from AAMC or 
NRMP affiliated websites. 
Affiliated Websites  
(e.g., NRMP.org, 
AAMC.org) 
“AAMC, AAFP. Advice was to 
rank according to true 
preference.” 
23. Designated 
advisor 
The participant was 
assigned an advisor from 
their medical school to 
navigate the NRMP 
process. 
Designated advisor “I was assigned an advisor for the 
residency application process, 
plus I had a separate advisor 
whom I trusted from my rotations 
...” 
24. Med. school 
dean 
The participant received 
advice from their medical 
school dean about the 
NRMP. 
Dean “I received emails, plus we had 
meetings with the dean of students.  
He basically just answered any 
questions we had and told us all of 
the standard advice.” 
25. Med. school 
faculty 
The participant received 
advice from a faculty 
member affiliated with 
their medical school about 
the NRMP. 
Faculty “I received advice from faculty 
that I trust who are also in the 
specialty that I applied to in the 
match.” 
26. Mentor The participant received 
advice from a mentor 
(from their medical school 
or otherwise) about the 
NRMP. 
Mentor “I received advice from my 
surgery mentor” 
27. Doctors The participant received 
advice from practicing 
physicians about the 
NRMP. 
practicing doctors “Community physicians 
recommended ranking most highly 
those places I believes I had the 
best chance of matching” 
28. Med. school 
administration 
The participant was 
contacted by or sought 
information from their 
medical school 
administration about the 
NRMP. 
School administration  
(e.g. "the school sent 
me an email") 
“Emails from administration that 
detailed statistics on what 
ultimately made residents happy 
with their decisions.” 
29. Current residents The participant received 
advice from current 
residents about the 
NRMP. 
current residents “current residents: they told me to 
tell my #1 choice that I was 
ranking them” 
30. Family The participant received 
advice from members of 
their family about the 
NRMP. 
Family “My parents gave me advice and 
they told me to rank based on my 
goals and where I will be happy.” 
31. Med. school 
classmates 
The participant received 
advice from their fellow 
medical school classmates 
about the NRMP. 
classmates “Fellow students in my class. They 
repeated the same advice as the 
NRMP: to rank programs in their 
true order.” 
32. Residency 
programs 
The participant received 
advice from one or more 
residency programs about 
the NRMP. 
Residency programs “On many interviews, the PDs told 
us to rank every program we 
interviewed at and to rank them 
based upon where we feel we 
would fit in best…” 
33. NRMP The participant received 
advice from the NRMP 
(either directly through 
their website or via school 
NRMP “I received countless emails, often 
citing NRMP sources,” 
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administration emails) 
about the NRMP. 
34. Friends The participant received 
advice from their friends 
about the NRMP. 
Friends “Friends. Basically telling me to 
do whats important for me.” 
35. Spouse The participant received 
advice from their spouse 
about the NRMP. 
Spouse “My wife--she advised me to stay 
here, as she is a PhD student and 
still has a few years left in er 
program…” 
36. Other sources The participant received 
advice from sources not 
specified in items 23-35. 
Other sources “Original peer-reviewed article 
describing match's mathematical 
algorithm” 
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Table S8. Model with All Trust Predictors. Shown are the estimated average marginal effects 
derived from a logit model predicting truth-telling in the experimental task using the three 
measures of trust in other market participants. All predictors are binary. Standard errors in 
parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Average Marginal Effects 
(SE) 
  
Trust in Residency Programs to Evaluate Students Fairly -0.05* 
 (0.021) 
  
Trust in Other Medical Students to Submit Truthful ROLs 0.01 
 (0.022) 
  
Trust in the NRMP to Run the Algorithm Honestly 0.06 
 (0.069) 
Observations 1714 
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Table S9. Predictors of Truth-Telling Status. Shown are the logit estimates plotted in Figure 
4, and a replication of these estimates using OLS. Models 1 and 3 present estimates obtained 
from the complete model, including the entire battery of predictors. Models 2 and 4 presents the 
estimate for each univariate model, predicting truth-telling with only the single variable 
represented in that row. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 AME Derived from  
Logit Model 
Beta Coefficients  
Derived from OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model: Complete Univariate  Complete  Univariate  
Strategic Position in Market 0.03** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.04*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
     
Cognitive Ability 0.05*** 0.03** 0.05*** 0.03** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) 
     
Overconfidence  0.08** 0.02 0.08** 0.02 
 (0.028) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) 
     
Salient Expectations -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
     
Medical School Advice 0.04 0.08*** 0.04 0.08*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) 
     
NRMP Advice 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) 
     
Student Advice -0.01 0.04* -0.01 0.04* 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) 
     
Other Advice 0.07** 0.09*** 0.07** 0.09*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
     
Residency Trust -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
     
NRMP Trust 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.062) (0.063) 
     
Student Trust 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
     
Observations 1714 1714 1714 1714 
 
 
